This article combines theory and historical narratives to shed new light on the politics surrounding the making of central bank independence in contemporary Britain. Its central argument is that Gordon Brown's decision to rewrite the British monetary constitution in May 1997 constituted an act of political manipulation in a Rikerian sense. The institutional change involved can be conceptualized as a heresthetic move, that is, structuring the process of the political game so you can win. The incoming government removed a difficult issue from the realm of party politics in order to signal competence and enforce internal discipline in the context of a government that was moving toward the right. But building on Elster's constraint theory, the paper argues that the institutional reform was not a case of self-binding in an intentional sense. Rather, Brown adopted a precommitment strategy that was aimed at binding others, including members of his government. The reform had dual consequences: it was not only constraining, it was also enabling. The institutionalization of discipline enabled New Labour to achieve key economic and political goals. By revisiting the political rationality of precommitment, this paper questions the dominant credibility story underlying the choice of monetary and fiscal institutions. 
Introduction
This paper looks at the politics surrounding a pivotal change in the rules of the game governing British political economy. On 6 May 1997, the newly elected Labour government surprised friends and foes by announcing that the power to set interest rates would be transferred from the Treasury to the Bank of England. Giving the Bank operational responsibility for setting interest rates should be seen as a seminal event. This momentous change in the 'constitution of economic policy' 1 was regarded by Tony Blair as 'the biggest decision in economic policy-making since the war'.
2
Many commentators went further and argued that the move was 'the most significant shake-up at the Bank of England in its 300-year history'. 3 In hindsight, one might argue that central bank independence (CBI) in Britain was simply an idea whose time has come. Yet the paradox is that at the time nobody saw it coming. Although New
Labour had signalled financial reform in its election manifesto, the issue was barely mentioned during the campaign. Indeed, 'Brown got through fifty interviews and press conferences during the campaign without being seriously questioned over his plans for the Bank of England'. 4 Even the most perceptive journalists were astonished by Brown's bold and unexpected move. 5 According to the Financial Times:
'Labour's election manifesto had seemed to suggest this momentous change in the conduct of economic policy was on a fairly distant horizon'. 6 The adoption of central bank independence in Britain poses an explanatory puzzle: if independence is supposed to enable a central bank to resist pressures from elected politicians, why might those politicians have an incentive to establish independent The aim of this article is to provide a political economy account of the origins of central bank independence in Britain. As a point of departure, I assume that to remove monetary policy from the political sphere is a political act. 10 Given this assumption, this article stresses the strategic nature of institutional creation and assesses the role of political entrepreneurs in the process of institution-building. In particular, I will claim that William Riker's notion of heresthetic is a useful analytical tool for understanding the logic of institutional formation. I will focus on two mechanisms which I suggest were at work in the thinking of the 'founding fathers'.
11
First, building on Jon Elster's reformulation of his original thesis on 'Ulysses and the Sirens', 12 I will argue that precommitment strategies are about binding others rather than being acts of self-binding. Second, I will contend that institutional commitments consensus regarding the factors that determine the choice of monetary institutions, and cannot resolve disagreement about the precise processes by which politics affects the choice of these institutions. 19 Theories of institutional change are still 
Britain's puzzling road to central bank independence
What explains the choice of monetary institutions in general and independent central banks in particular? An established literature has looked at the costs and benefits of alternative monetary regimes from an economic perspective. 20 The starting point of this approach is the macroeconomics of time-inconsistency. Time-inconsistency models point to the welfare losses that arise when a policy announced for some future period is no longer optimal when it is time to implement the policy. Economists have proposed institutional responses to the credible-commitment problem of timeinconsistent plans. Following Kydland and Prescott, some scholars have advocated 'rules rather than discretion' in the governance of monetary affairs. 21 Others have observed that 'credibility may be achieved by delegating powers to suitably designed institutions'. 22 For example, Giavazzi and Pagano discussed the advantages of handing over power to a conservative foreign bank. 23 In the same line, Rogoff argued that the right incentives could be generated by setting up an independent central bank that is staffed with inflation-averse officials.
24
It is often assumed that there is a strong economic case for insulating central banks from the influence of elected politicians. However, Kathleen McNamara argues that this conventional wisdom should not be taken for granted. 25 On the one hand, some studies have found that high central bank independence (CBI) is correlated with low-7 inflation performance, often at no costs in terms of output stabilization. 26 On the other hand, other scholars have shown that the apparent correlation between CBI and low inflation is not causal. 27 In fact, it is highly sensitive to measures of independence, the time period chosen, and especially to the countries included in the sample. 28 But even assuming that there is a strong economic case for choosing an independent central bank, the political logic of delegation remains a paradox. If independent central banks did nothing but limit the ability of governments to manipulate monetary policy for their own short-term gain, governments would never choose an independent central bank. 29 Delegation may be a way to achieving credible commitments. 30 But the core question remains: 'why did the same politicians who always preferred to have their hands on the monetary lever, suddenly opt to delegate such far-reaching powers to an independent technocratic institution?'
31
A body of research has exposed the limitations of the economic approach. This literature questions the apolitical nature of traditional optimal currency area and timeinconsistency models, which rely on the unwarranted assumption that monetary choices are made by benevolent social planners motivated by welfare considerations.
By neglecting the role of politics, the argument goes, approaches that focus solely on 35 Secondly, distributional or partisan explanations contend that central banks should be more independent in countries where anti-inflationary social interests are powerful, and that conservative parties, more concerned about inflation than unemployment and redistribution, should be more likely to support the institutionalization of price stability. 36 However, an alternative and more counterintuitive partisan argument is that left-wing parties lacking anti-inflation credibility may choose CBI to signal a commitment to responsible economic policies. 37 Thirdly, international ideational accounts suggest that, in the context of increasing economic openness and capital mobility, national politicians have been forced to grant CBI in order to achieve market confidence by reassuring international financial markets. 38 According to this logic, the growing popularity of this regime is rooted in a process of social diffusion of (appropriate) organizational models led by influential epistemic communities. 39 Fourthly, strategic explanations argue that political actors establish monetary commitments to lock in the policy preferences of the enacting coalition, 40 address the problem of political survival, 41 or to make it possible to shift the blame when something goes wrong.
42
Finally, integrative approaches to the politics of central banking examine the interaction of international, national and micro-institutional incentives.
43
The British case appears to defy conventional theories regarding the adoption of central bank independence. 44 To start with, governments of unitary countries with few veto players have little incentives to support a politically independent central bank. 45 This case also contradicts partisan and interest-group explanations. While the Labour Party surprisingly instigated this flagship neo-liberal reform in 1997, the powerful City of London, which was meant to be among the key winners of this institutional change, did not take the lead in the constitution-making process. Given that decisions over interest rates were bound to have significant distributive effects, it is also striking that neither the business community nor the Bank of England itself actively lobbied for independence. Finally, the British experience is not consistent with the most popular strategic argument, which contends that monetary commitments are used to constrain future governments.
At first glance, this case offers support to the hypothesis that politicians hand over policy tools to signal credibility to financial markets. Yet even though the binding implications of open markets featured strongly in the way the founding fathers perceived their own interests, the British road to independence was dominated by domestic considerations. 46 King argues that while the diffusion of ideas through epistemic communities is the key mechanism explaining central bank reform in 65 In certain moments of history, the introduction (or elimination) of dimensions involves the manipulation of institutional structures, as actors struggle to shape the mechanisms transforming preferences into outcomes in order to prevail in future political contests. Hence, heresthetical manoeuvres are a source of institutional change. However, while some politicians are strong on heresthetic, others not. 66 We will see that this issue played a key role in explaining the evolution of bank independence in Britain.
The concept of heresthetic is also a reminder that political agency matters in the process of institutional change. One way of incorporating agents into a model of institutional origins is to look at the behaviour of 'political entrepreneurs', who engage in institution building to make profits. 67 Transforming institutions is costly though. Political entrepreneurs must invest time and energy in the design of institutions from which they seek to secure political gains. In the reminder of this section, we will discuss two types of motivations: (1) the notion of binding others and (2) the enabling functions of institutional precommitments.
From self-binding to binding others
'In politics, people never try to bind themselves, only to bind others' Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound
The idea of self-binding is omnipresent in the credibility-based narratives explaining the choice of monetary arrangements. Several scholars have employed the metaphors of tying one's hands and burning own ships to describe the pre-commitment options available for achieving credibility in strategic interaction. 68 These metaphors have been widely applied to account for the evolution of fiscal and monetary commitments. 69 Correspondingly, Ulysses' self-binding logic is often used to explain the rise of independent central banking. As one expert put it:
'Perhaps the principal reason why central banks are given independence from elected politicians is that the political process is apt to be too shortsighted. Knowing this, politicians willingly and wisely cede day-to-day authority over monetary policy to a group of independent central bankers who are told to keep inflation in check…The reasoning is the same as Ulysses': He knew he would get better long-run results by tying himself to the mast, even though he wouldn't always feel very good about it in the short run!'
70
The abusive use of the self-binding rhetoric leads to misleading interpretations of the political logic of institutional solutions to problems of credible commitment.
Moreover, scholars writing on monetary commitments seem to be unaware of Elster's important U-turn on the rationale of self-binding. In Ulysses Unbound, he explicitly revisits and reformulates some of the key arguments of his influential Ulysses and the Sirens. In particular, he argues that: 'the transfer of concepts used to study individuals to the behaviour of collectivities, as if these were individuals writ large, can be very A would have asked to be bound had he known all the facts about the case and been capable of making an informed decision; and (4) A person bind himself merely for the purpose of creating a constraint that will also limit the freedom action of others.
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It is the last of these options that provides the most useful framework for understanding the Britain's path to independence. By strategically delegating power, Gordon Brown did not want to bind himself. Instead, the institutional choice was meant to constrain potential challengers while simultaneously increasing the capacity of the Treasury to control other departments' plans, enabling Brown to play a more powerful role than any previous Chancellor.
Enabling political institutions
'Common sense suggests that it is always preferable to have more options than fewer…very often common sense fails... Sometimes it is simply the case that less is more; people may benefit from being constrained.' Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound
By reading too much into the self-binding metaphor, most works on credibility overestimate the constraining dimension of institutional commitments. Institutional constraints are not only about limiting power. Indeed, the democratic paradox of constitutional pre-commitment is that constraints can be power-enhancing. As James 77 We will see below that the logic of enabling political institutions can also inform the evolution of Gordon
Brown's prudence. In a curious way, the strategy of constrained discretion ended up liberating rather than binding the Treasury. The government was able to exploit unprecedented political and financial opportunities, creating the conditions for significant increases in government spending.
The context of institutional choice
The overriding aim of central bank independence is to induce low and stable levels of inflation. British inflationary history has been problematic. During the so-called post- 'it would give Blair little time to consult others who might be cool about the idea'.
101
It was both striking and illuminating that this decision -for many the biggest change in economic policymaking since the war -was not discussed in the Cabinet, let alone referred to a formal consultation process. As Brown thought that making the move quickly was essential, the project was presented to Eddie George on a take-or-leave-it 'I was anxious above all to entrench our counterinflationary commitment and policies against the vagaries of future governments, possibly of a different political complexion'. 120 The proposal was turned down by Mrs. Thatcher, who believed that monetary policy, interest rates and the value of the pound were not technical affairs; they were rather at the heart of economic policy, if not quintessential to democratic politics. 121 Paradoxically, heresthetic considerations were probably behind her decision. She might have calculated that removing monetary issues from party political competition was bound to benefit Labour. According to Peston, a senior official of that government confessed that 'she recognized that such a move would reduce the electorate's fear of a Labour government'. 122 A deliberate 'non-decision' of this sort was probably one of the motivations. However, cognitive considerations played a crucial role as well. Would-be institutional reformers should be confident about the political power of institutions. Margaret Thatcher did not seem to share this belief. In her own words:
'My reaction was dismissive…I do not believe that changing well-tried institutional arrangements generally provides solutions to underlying political problems -and the control of inflation is ultimately a political problem'.
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Chancellor Lamont and Prime Minister Major also clashed over monetary policy.
Major wished to see interest rates 'as low as possible, but my frustration was with delays in implementing cuts that were to be taken'. 124 Following his predecessor, 'I said there were some indications that Labour might move in the direction of independence, but the PM wouldn't budge. Reluctantly I had to forget the idea' (Lamont 1999: 325) .
The Conservatives were trapped in a strategic conundrum. While some key players 'The failure of his party's past loomed large. Brown had seen too many Labour Chancellors lurch from profligate post-election boom to fatal pre-election bust. Stability, rules, discipline, prudence, transparency: the mantras were more than election slogans. They were the means by which the New Labour government would exorcise the past. The party, as Blair would often remind his colleagues, had never secured two full terms in office. It had foundered 143 instead on the rocks of successive economic crises. Stafford Cripps in 1948, James Callaghan in 1967, Denis Healey in 1976-all had been humiliated by the financial markets. The sterling crises in those years had been symptom as much as a cause of the failure of self-discipline. Subsequent elections defeats were proof that the Labour way of governing had been bad politics as well as bad economics'. 147 Since 1994, the architects of New Labour promoted radical programmatic, organizational and symbolic changes aimed at signalling an unmistakable break with the past. 148 Moreover, they endorsed a reckless politics of accommodation, even at the risk of overshooting the position of the median voter. 149 Notwithstanding its large parliamentary majority, the newly elected leaders wanted to avoid the fate suffered by past Labour governments. Andrew Rawnsley's books show that Blair and Brown were obsessed with proving their competence by pleasing the markets and finding ways of enforcing internal discipline. This thinking shaped the politics of central bank independence. As Ed Balls confessed:
'Establishing and retaining credibility is important for any central bank or government -but particularly for a new government from a political party which has been out of power for almost two decades and which has seen substantial changes in its party constitution and policy in a short space of years'. 150 Self-binding is the dominant narrative in most accounts of bank independence in Britain. As an article put it, 'by tying his hands to an independent monetary policy, Mr Brown should be able to avoid those perennial financial crises that have bedevilled previous Labour governments'. 151 Tying his hands? Actually this was not an act of self-binding in an intentional sense. Moreover, this self-binding rhetoric is at odds with conventional views regarding Gordon Brown's decision-making style.
Brown had a determination to maximize his authority at the expense of others. 152 This apparent paradox regarding Brown's behaviour can be resolved by realising that governments are not unitary actors, but coalitions of conflicting interests and ideas.
Once we move from the logic of individual to collective choice, precommitment strategies are about binding others, rather than acts of self-binding. By formally tying his hands, Brown really intended to bind others. 153 Following Elster's logic, he formally bound himself merely for the purpose of creating a constraint that would also limit the freedom of action of others.
Then, whose hands? The markets and the media supported the move because they fully understood that the reform aimed at binding politicians, including sectors of Brown's own party. The Chancellor did not hide this intention. In several speeches, he argued that 'interest rate decisions will be free from any political influence' and that 'we must remove the suspicion that short-term party political considerations are influencing the setting of interest rates'. 154 In a speech at the CBI national conference, Brown pleased the audience by saying that: 'the perception that monetary policy decisions have been dominated by short-term political considerations has grown. I believe we are agreed it is right to take these decisions out of politics, and to free them from short-term political pressures'. 155 Stephens also highlights that 'at the core of Brown's approach was the conviction that Britain's sad record of postwar economic mismanagement showed that politicians could not be trusted'.
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Which politicians were targeted by the strategic move? The Sun pointed, maliciously, to Old Labour: 'Brown's brilliant bid to defy Lefties'. 157 An article in The Guardian also argued that the reform 'cuts the new government adrift of all the Old Labour expectations like public sector unions expecting favours. In future the chancellor will be able to say it's not within his power to make special cases: the Bank rules'. 158 In the same line, Mr Lilley claimed: 'they want to remove any influence from Labour Back Benchers, whose demands for higher spending and laxer policy have wrecked every previous Labour Government'. 159 Another Conservative MP stated:
'The Chancellor and his senior colleagues must hope that the change will provide him with a defence against his Back Benchers, who will not be as cringing in their parliamentary behaviour as they have been so far. When things start to go wrong on the economic front, as undoubtedly they will in the nature of things, and when unemployment starts rising, as 153 It is also worth stressing that structural inflation (and hence interests rates) in major capitalist economies was much lower in the late 1990s. This means that the issue of who controls interests was less contentious than in the past. This factor might have also affected Brown's decision. 'The Government are now giving up power to an oligarchy whose interest point in the opposite direction of those of the people.'
The Old Labour issue has probably been overstated. The politics of interest rate setting in Britain is uniquely complex. 162 We should remember that Thatcher and
Major (not exactly Lefties), concerned about the reaction of small businesses and people with mortgages, were too willing to accommodate demands for lower interest rates. 163 In the US and even in pro-stability Germany, politicians and central bankers have also engaged in fierce arguments about monetary policy. 164 We should also remember that governments face pervasive collective action problems which compromise sound public finances. One journalist argued that 'the chancellor has armed himself with a potent new reason to resist demands from spending ministers'. 165 The intellectual master of the reform was fully aware of the importance of protecting the Chancellor from civil servants and other ministers. Brown not only faced pressures from party insiders and spending ministers, but also demands from interest groups. One of his biographers explained that 'his study of twentieth-century had convinced him that good policies and ideas were often derailed by interests groups and the pressures of the moment…This conclusion permeated his entire strategy'. 167 The group around Brown knew that pressures would not not only be exerted by the unions, who tend to be the usual suspects. Business interests could also exert strong pressure on Chancellors. Richard Lambert, CBI's Director General, repeatedly demanded the Bank of England to keep interest rates as low as possible to support economic activity. 168 The new Chancellor had strong reasons for trying to bind vested interests through political manipulation. In doing so, he was also constraining the Tories, which would find it more difficult to strategically use their influence over market actors to bully the Labour government.
Interest group dynamics were also important because a commitment to increasing productivity was one of the pillars of New Labour's political economy 169 and CBI would be inextricably linked to the politics of wage bargaining. 'The Bank of England have to meet an inflation target of 2.5 per cent. The target has to be met. Unacceptably high wage rises will not therefore lead to higher inflation but higher interest rates. It is in no one's interest if today's pay rise threatens to become tomorrow's mortgage rise. So wage responsibility -to rescue a useful phrase from a woeful context-is a price worth paying to achieve jobs now and prosperity in the long term. 189 They also contended that 'the answer is not no rules, but the right rules'. 190 Thus a post-monetarist path to stability should allow for both discretion and flexibility. As Brown repeatedly argued:
'In an open economy the discretion necessary for effective economic policy is possible only within a framework that guarantees the public interest is met, one that commands public trust and market credibility.' 'In the era of open capital markets, it is only within a credible framework that governments will command the trust to exercise the flexibility they require'. 191 Many commentators have failed to understand the cognitive and motivational nuances of this institutional choice. The institutional designers were not seeking to buy credibility by tying themselves to the mast of a strict binding commitment, as advocated by Giavazzi and Pagano. On the contrary, Balls was concerned with finding ways of 'escaping the straitjacket of ERM and EMU', including its deflationary effects. 192 Similarly, they were not uncritically embracing the central rigidity of the Stability and Growth Pact, Balls declared that a clear pre-commitment to credible institutional arrangements should 'allow the necessary flexibility so that policy can respond in the short-term to surprise economic events'. 193 Brown's economic framework was less about constraining and more about enabling than is often assumed. Indeed, the constraining element of the much-discussed 'constrained discretion' concept was only incorporated by Balls following a suggestion made by Mervyn King. 194 This is hardly surprising. While the central banker was interested in constraining politicians, the economist political operator was keen on buying flexibility through pre-commitment.
The enabling features of institutional commitment may be the key to understanding some of the tensions associated with Brown's chancellorship. Earlier assessments of his policies put the emphasis on prudence. 195 In its first term in office, New Labour broadly honoured its pre-election budget pledges and introduced the so-called golden rules establishing that over the economic cycle the government would only borrow to invest and that public debt would be held at a stable level. 196 The enactment of CBI was also supposed to induce budget discipline. This new macroeconomic framework enforced tight budgets in the early years. However, over time the corset was loosened and then removed altogether. In History of Modern Britain, Andrew Marr remarks that 'perhaps the most striking aspect of Brown's running of the economy was the stark, dramatic shape of public spending. For his first two years he stuck fiercely to the promise he had made about continuing Conservative spending levels…Then there was an abrupt and dramatic shift and public spending soared, particularly on health…So there were the lean years followed by the fat years, famine then feast, squeeze then relax'. 197 Fiscal policy was 'tight in the first years of New Labour but loosened significantly in subsequent years'. 198 This fiscal cycle led to the prudence for a purpose narrative. 199 As one commentator put it:
Indeed, the early [fiscal and monetary] restraint was 'to allow Brown, over time, to spend more than if he had splurged initially and then had been forced to tighten his belt, which had been the fate of his Labour predecessors at 11 Downing Street'. 200 As in many other historical experiences, the institutionalization of monetary discipline involved a critical fiscal dimension. Opening financial opportunities was one of the cornerstones of the strategy of constrained discretion. As Ben Clift and Jim
Tomlinson have lucidly argued, New Labour's decisive pursuit of market credibility 'was expressly concerned to create some space for fiscal activism'. 201 The mechanism was the following: as potential owners of government bonds thought inflation would be lower, they started paying more for government debt, freeing up the Chancellor to spend more while keeping taxes down. 202 This implies that, by strengthening monetary and fiscal governance, New Labour ended up creating conditions for a huge increase in education and health spending. Again, this is not a functionalist speculation. A Labour MP made the following point in the parliamentary debate:
narratives. It has been suggested that Brown was able to be a real socialist because he previously won the confidence of the financial markets. 207 In the logic of heresthetic, he could afford to do it because he previously reshaped the structure of the political game by manipulating the monetary constitution. But prudence for a purpose was not an unintended consequence of the institutional move. It was the natural implication of the successful implementation of an enabling precommitment strategy. As Brown once claimed: 'this extra public spending comes not at the expense of prudence but because of our prudence'. 208 Gordon was not bound, but unbound! To sum it up, the making of central bank independence in Britain was underpinned by typical New Labour strategic thinking. The attempt to institutionalize a 'postmonetarist approach to economic policy' 209 was based on a peculiar reading of the evolution of economic ideas and changes in the world economy. 210 It was also based on an explicit attempt to move beyond 'the old methods of old left or old right',
Conclusions and implications
'Looking at historical situations or tempering formal models through empirical analysis is the best way to understand ourselves and the world in which we live.' Norman Schofield, 'Constitutional Political Economy ', p. 299 This article combines theory and historical narratives to explain a seminal constitutional change in contemporary Britain. The main argument is that Gordon Similarly, the reform was not driven by the logic of constraining. On the contrary, the institutionalization of discipline sought to achieve in-built flexibility through constrained discretion, enabling the Chancellor to achieve important economic and political goals. All these findings are well grounded in extant empirical evidence to date; but they are also subject to revision in the light of alternative interpretations of available evidence or the emergence of new evidence. 214 Theories of endogenous institutions are still underdeveloped, 215 probably because there is an element of contingency regarding the sufficient causes of rapid change. Greater central bank independence has emerged in the last decades as the paradigm of good economic governance. 218 This monetary consensus should not be taken for granted though. Both the theoretical and empirical cases for independence are not uncontroversial. Works documenting an apparent association between CBI and low inflation are still undermined by causality issues, measurement errors, omittedvariable biases and sampling problems. 219 More importantly, the effects of central bank independence on inflation may be contingent on countries' underlying political and societal constraints. 220 The new monetary orthodoxy entails significant 'institutional paradoxes'. 221 Finally, the logics of delegation and democratic accountability are not easily reconciled. 222 These remaining uncertainties call for more in-depth and context-specific analysis of the evolution and implications of monetary institutions. This case study has shown that the cognitive and political underpinnings of central banking reforms are more nuanced than often suggested.
Economists assume that hard monetary commitments would enforce budget discipline. But history shows that institutional innovations aimed at controlling rulers' discretion may induce financial revolutions which relax the existing budget constraints of private and public agents. 223 In the worst case scenario, the politics of cheap money leads to a financial disaster. Examples are not in short supply. In
Argentina, an ultra-hard monetary arrangement created the conditions for an unsustainable financial bubble which burst tragically in December 2001. In Greece, the combination of the single currency with independent national budget policies encouraged fiscal profligacy, leaving the country on the verge of financial
